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This paper is to investigate the reasons of income inequality across provinces. Using 
1988 and 2013 CHIP individual data from 14 provinces and 13 sectors (16 sectors in 2013), 
the province level natural log of income differences increased by 3.06 between 1998 and 
2013.  The average schooling increased by 1.79 years and the share of agricultural sector 
decreased by 41% during this period. However, the overall individual level income variance 
increased from 0.16 in 1988 to 0.64 in 2013. The increase in within-sector income variance is 
responsible for the increased variances. In my analysis, I assume the education effect, return 
to schooling and sector share shift can contribute to the income variances. Among these three 
factors, the increase in return to schooling and sector share shift from agricultural sectors to 












CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
During the economic transition over the past 4 decades, income inequality in China 
kept a very clear increasing trend. Based on the original Ravallion and Chen data for the 
1981-2001 period and the latest data released by the NBSC for the period from 2003 to 2015, 
“income inequality in China substantially increased from its nadir of 28.3 points in 1983 to 
its peak of 49.1 points in 2008, then fall down slightly to 46.2 points in 2015” (R. Molero-
Simarro, 2017: p. 108). There are some literatures study the inequality in China. Khan et al. 
(1992) decompose the urban Gini index by income source based on CHIP survey data, and 
find that the contributors are wage (34%) and house subsidies (24%). R. Molero-Simarro 
(2017) investigate the inequality from the evolution of functional distribution of income and 
find out the increase of capital income share in top income urban household. Meng (2004) 
finds that during the marketization of urban sectors, the increase in unemployment led to a 
fall in urban worker’s income and then reduced the inequality in the urban labor market. Shi 
et al. (2016) investigate the evolution of urban inequality from the angle of wage structure 
between 1995 and 2013, and find that regional gap and inequality of human capital are major 
contributors to overall wage inequality. Ma and Li (2016) evaluate the effect of minimum 
wage on urban inequality from 1993 to 2013 and find that the increase of minimum wages 
had a positive effect on the wage levels of the low-wage group only from 2007–2013; there 
was no such effect from 1993–1995 and from 1998–2002. Song (2017) study the household 
consumption inequality in urban China over 1995-2013 using 1995, 2002 and 2013 CHIP 
data. She found that the increase in consumption expenditure per capita increased remarkable 
after 2002. However, the consumption inequality increases over the period. She also found 
the inequality of basic food consumption is much smaller than the overall consumption and 
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decreasing steadily. By contrast, clothing consumption inequality is much larger and 
increasing sharply with the time. The inequality of housing consumption is decreasing and is 
much larger in the upper half than in the lower half. In addition, the share of food 
expenditure decreases steadily to 25% as the overall consumption level moving up. The share 
of clothing in overall consumption remains about 7% over time but exhibits downward 
sloping. The share of housing consumption sharply increased to 38% in 2013. All those 
evidences imply the increase in income gap between the poor and the rich. 
In this paper, I focus on the income variances across industry sectors instead of the 
urban- rural gaps. During the globalization, the evolution of inequality, especially the 
structural change in the labor market, deserves intensive study. First, the urbanization process 
will continue for a long time in China. The farming activities is no longer an only sector in 
the rural area. With the investment in less-developed provinces, labor-intensive industries are 
declining, and the knowledge-intensive industries emerges. The employment structure 
change will play an important role in the evolution of overall inequality in China. There have 
been some studies on China’s structural change, but few has attempted to bring the shift 
share for each industry and the evolution of income inequality together. Second, most 
existing studies focus on explaining the low return to schooling during the economic 
transition or expanding college access in recent years, but few attentions has been paid to 
associate the return to schooling with the structural change in employment.  
To investigate the structural change effect on income inequality, I use the CHIP data 
in 1988 and 2013, to make the inequality decomposition and regressions possible. I assume 
the transition from farming to manufacturing and then to service or high skilled sectors will 
increase the overall income inequality. 
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The paper proceeds as follow. Chapter 2 provides some background for the industrial 
distribution, education and return to education. Chapter 3 introduces the data. Chapter 4 gives 
the decomposition of variables over time. Chapter 5 is to investigate the determinations of 


















CHAPTER 2. SOURCES OF INEQUALITY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Industrial Distribution 
Since the economic reform started in 1978, China has received a large part of 
international direct investment flows. The introduction of foreign ownership through foreign 
direct investment (FDI) pushed the economy from collective towards marketization. In 1985, 
labor mobility across areas was relaxed and local governments were mandated to accept rural 
migrants into cities as part of their non-agricultural population. In mid-1990s, several policies 
were made to encourage more high-technology and more capital intensive FDI projects. In 
1980, the first four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in Guangdong and 
Fujian provinces and offered special incentive policies for FDI in these SEZs. The purposes 
are to attract overseas capital and also as a showcase for the potential impacts of reform. 
While FDI in-flows were highly concentrated within these provinces, the amounts remained 
rather limited (Cheung and Lin, 2004). After 1984, Hainan Island and fourteen coastal port 
cities across ten provinces were opened, which were essential to support an export-oriented 
strategy. The realized value of inward FDI to China reached 3.49 billion dollars in 1990. 
Since SEZs and their positive economic impacts were solely a costal endeavor, the expected 
spillover effects from coastal to inland provinces failed to materialize. In reaction to the 
widening regional gap, more broadly-based economic reforms and open door policies were 
pushed forward in the 1990s. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping adopted a new approach which turned 
away from special regimes toward more nation-wide implementation of open policies. And 
the decentralization of state control, privatization of the state sector began to accelerate. 
Since 1992 inward FDI in China has accelerated and reached the peak level of 45.5 billion 
dollars in 1998. After a drop due to the Asian crisis, FDI inflows into China surged again, so 
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that “by 2010 China had accumulated FDI stock of 579 billion, well ahead of other large 
developing and transition economies” (OECD, 2016: p. 10). In 1998, all state enterprises, 
except a few large monopolies, were liquidated and sold to private investors. “China’s entry 
to the WTO in 2001 is likely to deepen China’s integration in the international segmentation 
of production processes and as such should reinforce the FDI attractiveness position of 
China” (Madariaga, 2007: p. 839).  
Thus, FDI plays a major role in transforming the Chinese economy. The role of 
foreign companies is to bring in new production and managerial technologies, together with 
local labor, to increase capital and improve the overall productivity of the economy. In 
addition, it creates employment opportunities. “Foreign firms employed around 20 million 
workers (three percent of China’s total employment) at the end of the 1990s” (Madariaga, 
2007: p. 840). Furthermore, foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) modifies China’s industrial 
structure because FDI incorporates much more equipment and technology knowledge. An 
important difference in industrial structure between FIEs and domestic firms is that FIEs are 
relatively more concentrated in the newly developing and fast-growing industries such as 
information technology and electronic equipment. By contrast, domestic firms are more 
present in the conventional basic capital-intensive and large-scale industries.  
As mentioned above, the direction of FDI is encouraged by exogenous geographical 
and political factors. The SEZs were attracting more foreign investment enterprises ahead of 
other regions because of their accessibility to port infrastructures and foreign markets. Hence, 
I assume that the labor market structural change caused by the economic policies (labor force 
moving from low-skilled sectors to high-skilled sectors) would cause the income inequality. I 
would expect the more opened (coastal) provinces had more concentration in manufacturing 
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industries at the beginning of reform and then transit to service sectors. The other regions had 
more farming activities at the beginning of reform will transit to conventional industry 
sectors. Overall, the different speed of economic reform across provinces could result in the 
income inequality. 
2.2 Human Capital Investment 
The geographical dispersion of China’s investment in human capital is large. As 
shown in Table 1, the proportion of population with more than twelve years schooling (at 
least some college degree) was 4% in 2000 and had risen to 10% in 2010, this is due to the 
sharp increase in the enrollment and public funding for college students starting in 1999. The 
proportion of population with high school degree was 13% in 2000 and had risen to only 
15% in 2010. The proportion of individuals who had at least a high school education was 
approximately 31% in coastal region, 27% in the northeast, 24% in the interior regions, but 
19% in the west in 2010. The Chinese government made a law for nine-years of compulsory 
education (six years of primary education plus three years of secondary education) in 1986. 
The ratio of high school enrollment (three years later) to middle school enrollment increased 
from 26% in 2000 to only 51% in 2015 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, Various 
Years), which means only one of two children can get into high school if we assume the 
compulsory education applied to all children. In 2015 the high school enrollment rate is 
approximately 58%, which means there are 7% of students don’t even graduate from middle 
school.  
The Chinese government and society appear to have failed to keep enough of the 
country’s young people in school during the recent decades of economic growth. The low 
rate of high school attendance can be attributed to high and rising costs. Academic high 
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school tuition fees in China are not free and are among the highest in the world (Liu et al. 
2009). College tuition fees also are burdensome for students from poor rural areas and they 
often do not qualify for need-based financial aid. More importantly, rural families encourage 
poor exam performance students to drop out from school because of high opportunity cost 
from staying in school. The parents would suggest their children to find jobs in cities because 
of increasing demand and wages of low-skills workers in urban area. Another thoughts are 
related to the poor teaching quality in the rural area. The annual college entrance exam 
(commonly known as Gaokao) is the only way for entrance into almost all higher education 
institutions at the undergraduate level. It is usually taken by students in their last year of high 
school. By the time students are ready to take the exam, most of rural students have dropped 
out of the system. Since it is based on test scores only, the remaining students in the rural 
area are not competitive in this exam compared to the urban students. In addition, major 
cities like Beijing and Shanghai are given higher quotas for admittance to college because the 
educational resources are not distributed evenly across China. Hence, the rural students are 
being discriminated in higher education. And that’s why they choose to drop out of school. In 
the short run, drop-out students can gain from migration to cities earlier than other students 
stay in school. In the long run, as too many people drop out of school too soon and the low-
skilled jobs that may have been plentiful, the migrant workers without secondary skills must 
struggle in the cities.  
Table 2 shows the schooling gap between urban and rural required by each 
occupation for the young generation aged 25-35 in 2013 and the average schooling for all 
individuals in 1988. The education gap between urban residents and rural residents varies 
between 1.4 to 3.9 years across industries. Only the sectors require higher skills (ie., IT, 
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Financial industry, Education) have slightly less education gap. The last column shows the 
average schooling in 1988. Since the compulsory education start after 1986, the young 
generation’s average schooling in 2013 can roughly reflect the results of this policy. We 
could see that the agriculture sectors gain from this policy and the education increased by 3.2 
years for rural workers and 5.9 for urban workers compared to the average schooling in 1988. 
For other sectors, the improvement in schooling are subtle in rural area. In contrast, the 
education level in urban areas have increased more than rural area in all sectors, which 
implies the higher human capital investment in more developed regions. Since we assume a 
positive relationship between education and wage, I assume the provinces with more 
percentage of rural residents have lower education level and less developed. 
Human capital has a direct role in production through the generation of worker skills. 
Fleisher and Chen (1996) find the regional inequality of investment in Chinese higher 
education can explain the high and rising regional income inequality. Hence I assume that the 
discrepancy of education obtained will result in regional inequality in China.  
2.3 Return to Schooling 
  Campos et al. (2016) analyzes the impact of education on income inequality 
between ethnic minorities and Han in China by using the data from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS) over the period 1993–2011. They found that there exists 
significant income inequality to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities but the return to 
education for ethnic minorities is high, which implies that a portion of the income gap can be 
overcome with additional education. They found that in general one additional year of 
education will increase earned incomes of ethnic minorities by 26.3–28% and in particular by 
13.5–14.4% for women from an ethnic minority group, by 10.4–14% for ethnic minorities 
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with urban household registration, and by 10.8% for ethnic minorities with rural household 
registration.            
Belskaya et al.(2014) evaluates whether the expansion of higher education is 
economically worthwhile based on a recent surge in the number of campuses and college 
graduates in Russia. They find that college expansion attracts individuals with lower returns 
to college, but the returns for marginal students who are directly affected by college 
expansion vary considerably depending on the scale of expansion and the type of location 
where new campuses are opened. Marginal individuals in smaller cities and locations without 
college campuses receive the largest benefits from new campuses.  
In China, higher education expanded almost six-fold in the decade 1988-2008. J. 
Knight et al. (2017) shows that the share of higher education graduates in total employment 
rose by 8 percentage points, but the graduate unemployment rate rose by only 1.4 percentage 
points. This implies that the higher education wage premium have been depressed by supply 
shock. Compared to high school leavers, the average hourly wage for the entry cohort of 
higher education graduates and university graduates fall over the five years. There’s the same 
pattern in the proportion of the “good job” for the entry cohort of higher education graduates 
and university graduates. In addition, the unemployment rate increased only for these 
cohorts. 
Keng, Lin and Orazem (2017) also investigated the expansion of college access and 
education quality on income inequality in Taiwan. They found that increasing college access 
alone will not lower inequality, the variance of wage income increased by 7 percent due to 
the surge of weakly- trained college graduates. As a result, firms substitute more experienced 
college-trained workers for their less experienced counterparts, leading to falling college 
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premia for young college graduates. Hence, the college-high school wage gaps of young and 
older workers have moved in polarizing directions.  
In this chapter, I will investigate if the structural change can be associated with rising 
wage premium for higher education. As mentioned above, the employment structures in 
China are shifting from labor-intensive industries to knowledge-intensive industries. The 
increasing labor demand of technology and high-skilled sectors during the globalization 
favor workers with higher education. Meanwhile, the expansion of college access and lower 
education quality can also reduce the advantages of college graduates. As suggested by 
Belskaya, the location of workers does make a difference. I assume the provinces with more 
universities (more college graduates) but lower concentration in higher-skilled industries will 
have lower wage premium because of the supply shock. To specify the structural change on 
income across provinces, I will estimate return to schooling using sectors and provinces as 











CHAPTER 3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Individual data from Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP 2013 and CHIP 
1988) are employed in this chapter to compare the provincial income inequality between 
1988 and 2013. This survey contains fourteen provinces in common of two databases. 
Working individual aged 18-65 are used as samples. The individual employment rate across 
industry sectors is used to summarize the density of industries in each province. In addition, 
the annual income and schooling years for each individual are used to estimate the return to 
schooling. Hence, the provincial average income is computed by the average annual income 













CHAPTER 4. VARIABLES DECOMPOSITION 
4.1 Decomposition of Shift Employment Share of Sectors 
Table 3 shows the share of labor by industry in 1988, 2002 and 2013. We can see that 
the good-producing industries decreased substantially from 74% in 1988 to 49% in 2002, 
then decrease to 44% in 2013. The decline trend mainly caused by the decrease in 
agricultural sector (from 45% in 1988 to 4% in 2013). Since economic reform, the labor 
market in China has undergone major structural change. The most significant shift share is 
the farming to nonfarming transition. Compared to other OECD countries, China has 
relatively higher deduction in the employment rate in the agriculture sector (China decreased 
by 20% and the average OECD members decreased by 3% between 1999 and 2013 (Word 
bank, 2017)).  
As opposed to the decline trend of other OECD countries, the employment rate in 
industry sector in China increased since 1999 and exceed the average OECD level at 2009 
then stay stable at 24% after 2010 (Word bank, 2017). From CHIP survey (in Table 3), the 
construction sector increased by 12%. Since China enter WTO in 2001, the labor share in 
manufacturing increased from 24% in 1988 to 29% in 2002 but decreased to 22% in 2013 
because of the increase in labor cost compared to other Asian countries. During the same 
time, the labor share of manufacturing in United States decreased slightly from 100 points in 
1988 to 92 points in 2002, then decrease sharply to 67 points in 2013 (US bureau of Labor 
Statistics) as a result of competition from globalization. Manufacturing is an important driver 
for economic growth in China, and China’s exports depends on continued exports of 
manufacturing products. Most provinces have the manufacturing sector as its major sector. 
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The decrease in labor share of manufacturing industries can also imply the replacement of 
human capital by advanced techniques.  
The service-providing industries increased sharply from 26% in 1988 to 51% in 2002, 
then continue to increase to 56% in 2013. Trade, Restaurants & Catering, Materials Supply 
and Marketing sectors increased from 8% in 1988 to 13% in 2002 and reach 17% in 2013. 
Personal Service and Counseling Services increased from 1% to 7% in 2002 and reach 10% 
in 2013. In addition, there are three new industries: IT, computer service and software; 
Leasing and business services; and Production and Supply of Electricity gas and water, 
which account for 6% of the labor share. Although it’s still far away from other OECD 
countries, China has higher growth in service sectors (from 26% in 1991 to 45% in 2013 
(Word bank, 2017)).  
In the United States, the share of middle skilled jobs (manufacturing, operatives-
assemblers, secretarial, clerical) decreased by 10% at the same time as the low skilled (local 
food and personal services) and high skilled jobs (managers, professionals) were increasing 
during 2002-2014 (Huffman, 2017). If China’s structural change follow western country’s 
change pattern, the employment in manufacturing sectors will continue to decrease. High-
skilled sectors would replace the low-end jobs, the workers with less skills were most likely 
get laid off and lost the earning power. The modern information technology and software 
automation have resulted in computerization of routine tasks and rapid displacement of labor 
in repetitive production and monitoring tasks. For example, online trading platform could 
replace the traditional bank teller; online shopping and Virtual Reality could reduce the 
physical stores and the automation could replace the manufacturing workers. Hence, the low-
skilled labor force needed by physical retail trading, residential service and banking sectors 
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will be declining. Instead, these conventional industries require more high-skilled managerial 
workers to control the software or information technology. This also implies the difficulty for 
migrants from less-developed provinces or from rural originally participating in lower-skilled 
job to move to higher-skilled job in cities. Hence, the workers need to be upskilled to adapt 
themselves to the new environment.  
Next, I will decompose the shift share into two parts: 
∆𝐸 =   ∑ ∆𝐸𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1







Where 𝐸𝑝 is the proportion of all employment in province 𝑝. 
𝐸𝑗𝑝  is the proportion of employment in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝. 
𝐸𝑗 is the proportion of employment in sector 𝑗 in total employment. 
𝜃𝑗  are the proportion of all country employment in sector j, where ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 = 1 . 
The first term (within term) is the change in sector share due to growing share of this 
sector in employment within provinces, holding relative provincial demand for labor fixed 
(ie, individual provinces have increased their demand for this sector compared to other 
provinces, even if they did not change their overall share of the workforce). 
The second term (between term) is the change in shares due to changes in 
employment between provinces, holding the mix of sectors within each province fixed (ie, 
sector share rises because provinces that hire this sector are growing).  
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Table 4 displays the shift share results. The changes in share across sectors are mainly 
due to the within-term changes (decrease by 17%). On average, the weighted average labor 
share of goods-producing industries decreased by 25% but the service-producing industries 
increased by 8%. Hence, we can conclude that the structural transition is from primary 
industry to secondary and tertiary industries.  
Bai and Qian (2010) also used the Solow (1958) decomposition method to quantify 
the two forces driving the movement in the aggregate labor share (of national income) during 
1978 and 2007 in China: structural transformation (estimated by value-added share change of 
each sector, use the income approach) and labor share changes within sectors. They found the 
two effects are both negative and together drive down aggregate labor share of 5.48 
percentage points from 1995 to 2003. They specified that “structural transformation from 
agriculture to non-agriculture sectors has shown negative impact on aggregate labor share 
since the mid-1980. Industry takes the major role in the within-sector change effect on 
aggregate labor share” (op.cit.: 651). They also questioned the China’s national income 
accounts as the “NBS counts mixed income of rural household from agriculture as labor 
compensation” and “overstated the labor share in agriculture”. In this chapter, I did not use 
income approach to weight the sector share and the sector share is calculated by the 
employment rate across provinces. My results verified that the labor share decrease in 
agricultural sectors drive down the aggregate labor share. The within-sector change effect 
dominates the aggregate changes. The employment share transit from agricultural sector to 
construction and service sectors can explain the aggregate labor change. 
4.2 Decomposition of Change in Income across Provinces 
The decomposition model displays as follows: 
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∆lny = ∑ 𝜃𝑝
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Where 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝 is the average income in province 𝑝. 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗 is the average income in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝. 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗 is the proportion of employment in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝. 
𝜃𝑝 are the proportion of all country employment in province p, where ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 = 1 . 
The first term (within term) is the change in average income due to raised income 
level within this sector, holding relative sectoral demand for labor fixed (ie, individual 
sectors have increased their remuneration for employees compared to other sectors, even if 
they did not change their overall share of the workforce). 
The second term (between term) is the change in average income due to changes in 
employment shares between sectors, holding the mix of wage within each sector fixed (ie, 
income rises because sectors that offer higher remuneration are growing).  
Table 4 displays the change in average income for the decomposition across 
provinces between 1988 and 2013. Compared to 1988, the average income grows by 3.06. 
89% of the income increase in China are due to the within-term changes. Due to the 
increased labor productivity and technology improvement after economic reform, the 
companies are willing to offer higher remunerations. The shift share can also contribute to 
11% of the income increase. The employees in Chongqin and Sichuan are more likely to be 
affected by the sector change. Or we can say the provinces with more farming to nonfarming 
transition have higher between term effects. From the province perspective, most provinces 
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have the income growth more than 3. Only Liaoning, Guangdong, Sichuan and Yunnan 
provinces have income growth less than 3. Among these provinces, Yunnan (2.41) has the 
lowest income growth and Jiangsu (3.37) has the highest income growth.  
4.3 Decomposition of Change in Average Schooling across Provinces 
The decomposition model displays as follows: 
∆Edu = ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑝







Where 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝 is the average schooling in province 𝑝. 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑗 is the average schooling in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝. 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗 is the proportion of employment in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝. 
𝜃𝑝 are the proportion of all country employment in province p, where ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1 = 1 . 
The first term (within term) is the change in average education due to raised requirement 
for education level within this sector, holding relative sectoral demand for labor fixed (ie, 
individual sectors have increased their demand for higher educated employees compared to 
other sectors, even if they did not change their overall share of the workforce). 
The second term (between term) is the change in average education due to changes in 
employment shares between sectors, holding the mix of skills within each sector fixed (ie, 
education rises because sectors that hire higher educated employees are growing).  
Table 5 displays the change in average education for the decomposition across 
provinces between 1988 and 2013. Compared to 1988, the average education grows by 1.79 
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years. The within-sector and between sector components are almost equally responsible for 
the increase in education.  The education change in Liaoning, Anhui, Hubei and Hunan are 
more likely to be affected by the sector shift share. The education change in Beijing, Henan 
and Gansu are more likely to be affected by the higher skills requirements within sectors. 
Among these provinces, Shanxi (0.27 years) has the lowest education improvement and 
Chongqin (4.08 years) has the highest education improvement. However, the average income 
improved by 3.03 in Shanxi and 3.04 in Chongqin, which means the return to schooling are 
quite different across provinces. 
Table 6 represents the average schooling and lny by sectors. Geological Prospecting, 
Scientific and Technical Services sector (13.96 years in 2013, 10.52 in 1988) and Finance 
sectors (13.80 years in 2013, 10.65 in 1988) have the relatively higher average schooling. 
This is very low education requirement compared to other countries. The samples used to 
calculate the average education are all adults aged 18-65. During Cultural Revolution (1966-
76), the higher education system was almost shut down. Until late 1977, the national higher 
education entrance examination was officially resumed but less than 1% of Chinese people 
had attended higher education. From the CHIP 2013 database, the average education level for 
older workers (aged 50-65) is around two years lower than the young workers (aged 18-35). 
It’s surprised that the average education level only increased by 2 years within almost two 
generations. From the return to schooling perspective, the sector with highest education level 
does not imply the highest wage. In addition, the return to schooling is not distributed equally 
across industries. From table 7, we could roughly estimate the Health, sports and social 
welfare sector has the highest return to schooling, Transport, communications, post and 
telecommunications sector has the lowest return to schooling between 1988 and 2013. Hence, 
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in the following CHAPTER, I will estimate the return to schooling in 1998 and 2013, 
separately and further investigate the impact of (1) changes in human capital investment 
(estimated by schooling), (2) changes in return to human capital and (3) changes in densities 

















CHAPTER 5. VARANCE DECOMPOSITION APPROACH 
We are interested in monitoring how the changing shares of industry sectors 
composition contribute to the income inequality.  Keng and Orazem (2017) uses the variance 
decomposition approach to decompose the changing variance of household income into three 
components: changing group population share, changing within-group income variance, and 
changing between-group income variance. In this chapter, I am going to use the same method 
to decompose the changing variance of individual income into three components: changing 
employment share of each sector, changing within-sector income variance, and changing 
between-sector income variance.  The changing variance is based on two years: (1) 1988: in 
the beginning period of reform and increased basic education investment, FDI mainly in 
coastal/SEC area; and (2) 2013: 35 years after the economic reform and surge of high-
knowledge/tech intensive industries 
The decomposition for the total variance in income 𝜎𝑌
2 is given as (suggested by Keng 
and Orazem, 2017):   
𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌
2 = ∑ 𝜃𝑝 ∗ {∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑝𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑝
2𝑘
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑝(𝑙𝑛𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑝 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌̿̿ ̿̿ ?̿?)
2
}𝑘𝑗=1𝑝      
where 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑝
2  is the within sector j variance of individual income in province p; 𝛼𝑗𝑝 is the 
sector j employment share of all labor force in province p; 𝑙𝑛𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑝 is the mean individual 
income for sector j in province p; and 𝑙𝑛𝑌̿̿ ̿̿ ?̿? is the overall mean individual income in province 
p.  The first term shows how much of the variance is due to inequality within sectors while 
the second term denotes how much of the income variance is due to inequality between 
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sectors. The country-level variance 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌
2  is the weighted average using employment 
proportion as weights: 𝜃𝑝.  
Table 7 reports the average values for the decomposition across provinces in 1988 
and 2013.  Over twenty-five years, the overall individual income variance increased 4 times.  
The within-sector components increased more than 5 times and its share in variance jumped 
from 64% to 91%. However, the between sector component remain at 0.06. Hence, the 
income variances within the industry sectors is responsible for the increase in individual 
income variance. For each province, we can also see the remarkable increase in income 
variance result from within-sector component. In addition, the between sector variance can 
also explain the increase in individual variance in most provinces except Anhui, Hubei, 
Hunan and Gansu, where we can observe decreased between sector variances. 
To illustrate the role of education effect, return to schooling effect and the sector 
share change on the increased income variances between 1988 and 2013, we set 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑝
2  in 1988 
as the base case and change one variable each time to separate the three factors.  First, we 
specify a baseline equation for the wage as a function of education, and control for industry 
sector and province only. Since I emphasis the effect of structural change on income, other 
control variables will be investigated in the next paper. Province level income can be 
summarized as the product of share of industry sectors and sector level income. 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒                              (a) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛
∗ ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑖                                                                      (b) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ∑ 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅𝑗                                                                    (c) 
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In equation (a), 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the log of annual income for individual 𝑖, in sector 𝑗, year 𝑡 and 
province 𝑝. 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the schooling years completed for individual 𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 is return to 
schooling. 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 are both dummy variables. In Eq. (c), 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑡 is the average 
income in province 𝑝. 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the share of industries 𝑗 in province 𝑝 and 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the average 
income for n individuals in sector 𝑗 in province 𝑝.  
The baseline equations enable us to measure provincial income by estimating three 
variables: 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡, 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡. We can make variation on one variable use different data 
after fixing all other variables to get the different results. 
Education effect Method: To demonstrate the role of the education effect on the income 
variance, we start from the actual individual income in 1988 and then construct 
counterfactual series of income use the individual schooling data from CHIP 2013 database 
instead of the schooling data in 1988 to estimate the individual income variances. First, 
estimate the regression coefficients (𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ , 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂  and 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ ) in equation (a11) using 
CHIP 1988 individual survey data. Second, apply these coefficients to equation (a12) to 
estimate 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂  using CHIP 2013 individual schooling data for each individual in 2013. 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗2013 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅could be computed by average 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂  for n individuals in industry sector 𝑗 in 
province 𝑝 (b1). By using the 1988’s industry share 𝛼𝑝𝑗1988 to equation (c1), we can get the 
estimated average income in province 𝑝.  (CHIP 2013 has three new industry sectors: IT, 
computer service and software; Leasing and business services; Production and Supply of 
Electricity gas and water. Individuals from new industries in 2013 are excluded in computing 
the average income because we only have return to education 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 for the industries 
existing in 1998.) 
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𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒          (a11) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂ = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒         (a12) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗2013̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛𝑝𝑗2013
∗ ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂𝑖                                                                             (b1) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∑ 𝛼𝑝𝑗1988 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑗2013̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅𝑗                                                                              (c1) 
Return to schooling Method: Similarly, we construct counterfactual series of income using 
the estimated return to schooling from CHIP 2013 database to estimate the individual income 
variances. First, estimate the regression coefficients in equation (a21) using CHIP 2013 
individual survey data. Second, apply these coefficients to equation (a22) to estimate 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂  using CHIP 1988 individual schooling data for each individual in 1988. Since the 
share of industries in each province are set to be unchanged, we could average  𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂  for 
𝑛𝑝 individuals in province 𝑝 to calculate the province level income (equation c2).  
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗2013 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒          (a21) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂ = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂ ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑗1988 + 𝛾𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂ ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑝𝑗2013̂ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒          (a22) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛𝑝1988
∗ ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑝𝑗1988̂𝑖                                                                               (c2) 
Sector share Method: To demonstrate the share change effect, we construct the 
counterfactual income variance by altering the sector employment share to be 𝛼𝑗𝑝 in 2013. 
That is, change 𝛼𝑝𝑗1988 to be 𝛼𝑝𝑗2013 in equation (c). 
From Table 7, the actual individual income variance has grown by 4 times from 0.16 
to 0.64 between 1988 and 2013.  From Table 8, the first counterfactual series (Education 
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effect) suggests that the individual income variance would have decreased to 0.03 if the only 
factor changed is average schooling. Although all provinces have improved their education 
investment, the return to education in 1988 is only 0.005. The low return to schooling 
explains the low volatility of individual income. In addition, the variance of individual 
education decreased from 16.87 in 1988 to 11.54 in 2013. The increased education 
investment in less-developed areas can also contribute the lower income variances. From the 
province perspective, Shandong, Chonqin and Sichuan have higher income variance than 
1988. These three provinces have relatively higher education improvement than other 
provinces. However, the between-sector variation increased because almost all the labor 
force goes to farming in 1988, which resulted in lower province level income relative to 
sector level income (higher 𝑙𝑛𝑌̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑝 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌̿̿ ̿̿ ?̿?).  The second counterfactual series (Return to 
schooling) indicates that the individual income variance would have grown to 0.23 if the only 
factor changed is return to schooling. The overall return to schooling jumps to 0.071 in 2013. 
The higher income variances compared to 1988 are mainly due to the higher education 
variance in 1988 and higher return to schooling in 2013. And the third counterfactual series 
(Sector share) indicates that the individual income variance would have grown to 1.10 if the 
only factor changed is the share. Since we are using the sector share in 2013, the provinces 
with large movements from farming to nonfarming sectors during 1988 to 2013 will have 
large income variation because they are dominated by between sector variation (for example, 
Shandong has 88% decrease in agricultural but 5.78 increase in income variance, and Hunan 
has 87% decrease in agricultural but 3.95 increase in income variance). Hence, from the 
direction of variance movements we could conclude that the return to schooling and share 
change are two key reasons for the increased income variance in 2013.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
In recent decades China has experienced remarkably high and sustained economic 
growth rate. High growth rate depends on the industrial revolution from farming to 
nonfarming sectors, improvements in educational attainment and return on schooling. 
Although the return to schooling increased from 0.005 in 1988 to 0.071 in 2013, the average 
schooling years only increased by 1.8 years to 9.8 years in 2013. The increase in return to 
schooling can be explained by the economic transformation from labor intensive sectors to 
knowledge intensive sectors and rapid economic growth. Although the nine-year compulsory 
schooling policy improved the average schooling, the low requirement only eliminate 
illiteracy and far away from the quality-oriented education. If the increase in education 
investment could be matched with the increase in return to schooling, the income growth 
would be faster. 
From the individual level perspective, the income inequality is widening since the 
economic transition in what was already considered to be one of the most unequal economies 
in the world. The individual level income variance increased from 0.16 in 1988 to 0.64 in 
2013. The inequality decomposition suggests that it is mainly attribute to the within-sector 
income gap. In addition, I am trying to use three effects: schooling, return to schooling and 
employment share change to explain the inequality. From the movement of the variance, we 
found that the increased return to schooling and shift share from agricultural sectors to other 





Table 1. Education investment by provinces 









  Liaoning       72% 16% 12% 80% 13% 7% 
 Jilin         72% 18% 10% 79% 16% 5% 
 Heilongjiang  75% 15% 10% 80% 15% 5% 
  Beijing       45% 22% 33% 58% 24% 18% 
  Tianjin       60% 22% 18% 69% 22% 9% 
  Hebei         78% 14% 8% 86% 11% 3% 
  Shandong      76% 15% 9% 85% 11% 4% 
  Shanghai      55% 22% 23% 65% 24% 11% 
  Jiangsu       71% 18% 11% 82% 14% 4% 
  Zhejiang      76% 14% 10% 85% 12% 3% 
  Fujian        76% 15% 9% 86% 11% 3% 
  Guangdong     72% 19% 9% 82% 14% 4% 
  Hainan        75% 17% 8% 83% 14% 3% 
  Shanxi        74% 17% 9% 84% 12% 4% 
  Inner Mongolia 73% 16% 11% 81% 15% 4% 
  Henan         78% 15% 7% 86% 11% 3% 
  Shaanxi       72% 17% 11% 82% 13% 5% 
  Anhui         81% 12% 7% 89% 9% 2% 
  Jiangxi       79% 13% 8% 86% 11% 3% 
  Hubei         72% 18% 10% 83% 13% 4% 
  Hunan         75% 17% 8% 85% 12% 3% 
  Guangxi       81% 12% 7% 87% 10% 3% 
  Chongqin     77% 14% 9% 88% 9% 3% 
  Sichuan       81% 12% 7% 89% 8% 3% 
  Guizhou       86% 8% 6% 91% 7% 2% 
  Yunnan        85% 9% 6% 90% 8% 2% 
  Tibet         89% 5% 6% 95% 4% 1% 





Table 1. Education investment by provinces continued 
 
  Qinghai       79% 12% 9% 85% 11% 4% 
  Ningxia       76% 14% 10% 84% 12% 4% 
  Xinjiang      76% 12% 12% 81% 13% 6% 
Average 75% 15% 10% 83% 13% 4% 
Northeast 73% 16% 11% 80% 14% 6% 
North coast 65% 18% 17% 74% 18% 8% 
East coast 68% 17% 15% 77% 17% 6% 
South Coast 75% 16% 9% 83% 13% 4% 
Huanghe middle 74% 16% 10% 83% 13% 4% 
Changjiang middle 77% 15% 8% 86% 11% 3% 
Southwest 82% 11% 7% 89% 8% 3% 
Northwest 80% 11% 9% 86% 10% 4% 






Table 2. Schooling years by industries: 
   schooling years for aged 25-35 in 2013 1988 
 





Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry, Fishing 
11.7 9 2.7 5.8 
Construction 12.9 9.1 3.9 8.7 
Manufacturing 12.4 9.5 3 9.3 
Mining 11.9 9.6 2.3 10 
Service-Providing 
Industries 
Trade, Restaurants & Catering, 
Materials Supply and Marketing 
12 9.9 2.1 9.4 
Personal Services and 
Counseling Services 
11.8 9.5 2.3 8.6 
Education, Culture, and Art 15 13 1.9 12 
Party, Government, or Social 
Organs 
14.5 11.8 2.6 11.2 
Finance, Insurance 15 13.3 1.7 11.4 
Real Estate and Public Utilities 13.7 12.3 1.4 10 
Health, Sports, and Social 
Welfare 
14.8 11.7 3.1 11.9 
Transport, Communications, 
Post and Telecommunications  
12.4 9.7 2.7 9.6 
Geological Prospecting, 
Scientific and Technical 
Services 
15.9 13.2 2.7 12.8 
IT, computer service and 
software 
14.3 12.3 1.9  
Leasing and business services 12.2 10.1 2.2  
Production and Supply of 
Electricity gas and water 
14 10 3.9  







Table 3. Share of labor by industry, 1988, 2002 and 2013 
 Sectors 2013 2002 1988 
Goods-Producing Industries Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry, Fishing 
4% 7% 45% 
Construction 15% 11% 3% 
Manufacturing 22% 29% 24% 
Mining 3% 2% 2% 
Sum 44% 49% 74% 
Service-Providing Industries Trade, Restaurants & Catering, 
Materials Supply and Marketing 
17% 13% 8% 
Personal Services and 
Counseling Services 
10% 7% 1% 
Education, Culture, and Art 5% 6% 4% 
Party, Government, or Social 
Organs 
6% 8% 5% 
Finance, Insurance 1% 2% 1% 
Real Estate and Public Utilities 2% 1% 1% 
Health, Sports, and Social 
Welfare 
3% 3% 2% 
Transport, Communications, 
Post and Telecommunications 
7% 7% 4% 
Geological Prospecting, 
Scientific and Technical 
Services 
0% 1% 2% 
IT, computer service and 
software 
2% 0% 0% 
Leasing and business services 2% 0% 0% 
Production and Supply of 
Electricity gas and water 
2% 2% 0% 






Table 4. Decomposition of the shift share between 1988 and 2013 
  Within Between Sum 





Goods-Producing Industries Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry, Fishing 
-41% 0% -41% 
Construction 12% 0% 12% 
Manufacturing -2% -1% -3% 
Mining 1% 0% 1% 
Average -25% 0% -25% 
Service-Providing Industries Trade, Restaurants & Catering, 
Materials Supply and Marketing 
9% 0% 9% 
Personal Services and Counseling 
Services 
9% 0% 9% 
Transport, Communications, Post and 
Telecommunications  
3% 0% 3% 
IT, computer service and software 2% 0% 2% 
Leasing and business services 2% 0% 2% 
Production and Supply of Electricity 
gas and water 
2% 0% 2% 
Others* 4% 0% 4% 
Average 8% 0% 8% 
 China -17% 0% -17% 
*Others include Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Public Utilities, Health, Sports, and Social Welfare, Geological Prospecting, 
Scientific and Technical Services, Education, Culture, and Art, Party, Government, or Social Organs sectors. These sectors have very 








Table 5. Decomposition of the lny change between 1988 and 2013 (Percentage are in parenthesis): 










Beijing 3.27 (99%) 0.04 (1%) 3.31 
Shanxi 2.91 (96%) 0.13 (4%) 3.03 
Liaoning 2.65 (90%) 0.29 (10%) 2.93 
Jiangsu 3.19 (95%) 0.18 (5%) 3.37 
Anhui 3.01 (93%) 0.22 (7%) 3.22 
Shandong 2.64 (84%) 0.49 (16%) 3.13 
Henan 2.85 (94%) 0.19 (6%) 3.03 
Hubei 2.85 (88%) 0.38 (12%) 3.23 
Hunan 2.58 (83%) 0.54 (17%) 3.13 
Guangdong 2.69 (96%) 0.12 (4%) 2.81 
Chongqin 1.97 (65%) 1.07 (35%) 3.04 
Sichuan 1.97 (70%) 0.85 (30%) 2.82 
Yunnan 2.21 (92%) 0.19 (8%) 2.41 
Gansu 3.08 (93%) 0.24 (7%) 3.33 











Table 6. Decomposition of the schooling change between 1988 and 2013 (Percentage are in parenthesis): 
 Within Between Sum 
Provinces ∑ ∆𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗1988
𝑗
 ∑ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑗2013 ∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑗
𝑗
 ∆𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑝 
Beijing 1.67 (89%) 0.20 (11%) 1.87 
Shanxi 0.14 (51%) 0.13 (49%) 0.27 
Liaoning 0.07 (12%) 0.47 (88%) 0.54 
Jiangsu 0.50 (35%) 0.91 (65%) 1.41 
Anhui -0.02 (-2%) 0.86 (102%) 0.84 
Shandong 2.23 (62%) 1.36 (38%) 3.59 
Henan 0.91 (71%) 0.36 (29%) 1.27 
Hubei 0.14 (13%) 0.90 (87%) 1.04 
Hunan 0.88 (27%) 2.37 (73%) 3.25 
Guangdong 0.32 (32%) 0.66 (68%) 0.98 
Chongqin 1.66 (41%) 2.42 (59%) 4.08 
Sichuan 1.73 (53%) 1.50 (47%) 3.23 
Yunnan 1.06 (66%) 0.54 (34%) 1.60 
Gansu 1.28 (78%) 0.36 (22%) 1.64 















2013 1988 Change 




Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry, Fishing 
7.46 9.33 5.75 6.93 1.70 (30%) 2.40 (35%) 
Construction 8.05 9.96 8.91 7.18 -0.85 (-10%) 2.77 (39%) 
Manufacturing 9.42 10.12 9.63 7.08 -0.21 (-2%) 3.04 (43%) 
Mining 9.15 10.21 9.53 7.12 -0.38 (-4%) 3.09 (43%) 




Trade, Restaurants & Catering, 
Materials Supply and Marketing 
9.4 10 9.74 7.09 -0.34 (-3%) 2.91 (41%) 
Personal Services and Counseling 
Services 
9.29 9.89 8.08 7.05 1.21 (15%) 2.83 (40%) 
Education, Culture, and Art 13.25 10.33 12.42 7.17 0.83 (7%) 3.16 (44%) 
Party, Government, or Social Organs 12.41 10.2 11.59 7.17 0.81 (7%) 3.03 (42%) 
Finance, Insurance 13.8 10.65 11.69 7.04 2.10 (18%) 3.60 (51%) 
Real Estate and Public Utilities 11.37 10.26 10.12 7.03 1.25 (12%) 3.23 (46%) 
Health, Sports, and Social Welfare 12.31 10.15 11.85 7.17 0.46 (4%) 2.99 (42%) 
Transport, Communications, Post and 
Telecommunications  
9.62 10.28 9.8 7.24 -0.19 (-2%) 3.03 (42%) 
Geological Prospecting, Scientific 
and Technical Services 
13.96 10.52 12.39 7.18 1.58 (13%) 3.33 (46%) 
IT, computer service and software 13.16 10.42     
Leasing and business services 10.54 10.1     
Production and Supply of Electricity 
gas and water 
10.69 10.25     
Average 10.58 10.21 10.83 7.14 -0.25 2.98 
 China 9.81 10.07 8.24 7.01 1.57 3.06 





Table 8. Decomposition of the Individual lny Variance: 1988 and 2013 (Percentage are in parenthesis): 












Province 1988 2013 1988 2013 1988 2013 
Beijing 0.15 (98%) 0.51 (84%) 0.00 (2%) 0.10 (16%) 0.16 0.61 
Shanxi 0.15 (84%) 0.68 (89%) 0.03 (16%) 0.08 (11%) 0.18 0.76 
Liaoning 0.13 (91%) 0.65 (90%) 0.01 (9%) 0.07 (10%) 0.14 0.72 
Jiangsu 0.14 (83%) 0.46 (94%) 0.03 (17%) 0.03 (6%) 0.16 0.49 
Anhui 0.10 (57%) 0.57 (93%) 0.08 (43%) 0.04 (7%) 0.18 0.61 
Shandong 0.01 (53%) 0.58 (94%) 0.01 (47%) 0.04 (6%) 0.02 0.61 
Henan 0.10 (82%) 0.61 (96%) 0.02 (18%) 0.03 (4%) 0.12 0.64 
Hubei 0.08 (43%) 0.56 (89%) 0.10 (57%) 0.07 (11%) 0.18 0.63 
Hunan 0.03 (29%) 0.65 (95%) 0.07 (71%) 0.03 (5%) 0.09 0.68 
Guangdong 0.20 (97%) 0.48 (94%) 0.01 (3%) 0.03 (6%) 0.20 0.51 
Chongqin 0.01 (27%) 0.49 (88%) 0.02 (73%) 0.07 (12%) 0.03 0.56 
Sichuan 0.01 (27%) 0.69 (92%) 0.02 (73%) 0.06 (8%) 0.03 0.75 
Yunnan 0.09 (56%) 0.74 (87%) 0.07 (44%) 0.11 (13%) 0.15 0.85 
Gansu 0.14 (28%) 0.58 (87%) 0.37 (72%) 0.09 (13%) 0.51 0.67 










 Education effect: 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑝
2  Return to schooling: 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑝
2  Sector share: 𝜎𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑝
2  
Province Within Between Sum Within Between Sum Within Between Sum 
Beijing 0.00 (2%) 0.01 (98%) 0.01 0.04 (26%) 0.11 (74%) 0.15 0.16 (97%) 0.39 (3%) 0.16 
Shanxi 0.00 (1%) 0.02 (99%) 0.02 0.04 (21%) 0.15 (79%) 0.19 0.20 (88%) 0.03 (12%) 0.22 
Liaoning 0.00 (1%) 0.01 (99%) 0.01 0.03 (18%) 0.14 (82%) 0.17 0.15 (6%) 2.54 (94%) 2.70 
Jiangsu 0.00 (1%) 0.02 (99%) 0.02 0.05 (23%) 0.19 (77%) 0.24 0.17 (92%) 0.01 (8%) 0.18 
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